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Macedonia has experienced a period of civic unrest following a pardon issued by president Gjorge
Ivanov to all the political ﬁgures incriminated in a wiretapping scandal that emerged in 2015. Misha
Popovikj states that while the immediate cause of the unrest is relatively straightforward, the roots
of the discontent are far more complex. He argues that it is not yet time to resume EU-brokered
negotiations, and that international actors should take advantage of a golden moment to empower
the country’s civil society actors. 
On Tuesday 12 April, the President of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov, did something that was
unthinkable: he issued a blanket pardon to members of the political establishment by halting ongoing investigations
into a plethora of cases of alleged corruption, abuse of oﬃce, embezzlement and election fraud. These
investigations were conducted by the Special Public Prosecutor Oﬃce – an institution set up to resolve cases that
arose from a wiretapping scandal in 2015, when a number of audio recordings were released to the public,
highlighting a series of transgressions by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE and BDI government.
Initially, the wiretapping crisis was addressed through the so called Przhino agreement of 2015, which was brokered
by the EU. The agreement set out a roadmap leading toward elections in April 2016. These actions included
increasing the capacity of the State Election Commission to organise fair elections; reestablishing Parliamentary
oversight over the Internal Security Agency of the Ministry of Interior (which performed the illegal wiretapping of key
oﬃcials of the government, opposition, journalists, businessmen and civil society activists); placing ministers or
deputies from the opposition in key ministries and implementing necessary reforms of the media; and establishing
the Special Public Prosecutor.
All these measures were in fact geared toward decreasing ties between the oﬃces of the state and the ruling party,
which was one of the key recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR for fair elections to take place in
Macedonia. Finally, 100 days before the elections, the Przhino Agreement stipulated that the Prime Minister, Nikola
Gruevski, should step down and resign, with a technical government being formed to organise the elections.
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The precise details of the agreement were left to be settled through a process of negotiations between the four major
political parties: VMRO-DPMNE and BDI from the ruling majority, and SDSM and PDSh from the opposition. VMRO-
DPMNE and SDSM are the two largest parties representing ethnic Macedonians and they generally form coalitions
with political parties of smaller ethnic groups: BDI and PDSh are the largest political parties representing ethnic
Albanians.
The negotiations, mediated by the EU, were marred by constant setbacks, resulting in severe delays which put into
question the possibility of fair and credible elections being held in April. Even though Nikola Gruevski resigned as
planned, international stakeholders (the EU and the United States) eventually produced authoritative analyses
which cast doubt on the elections being held, which were matched by calls from leading think tanks and watchdogs.
This set the stage for an extension to the original schedule and a new date for the elections (5 June) was ultimately
agreed.
This extension was made in order to provide more time for the voter registry to be cleared to address fears of
duplicate and ‘phantom’ voters that could be exploited for the purposes of election fraud. Although this cleanup has
begun and some progress has been made, it remains doubtful whether everything can be completed by June, with
about a third of the voters marked as ‘problematic’ in the database checks and tens of thousands being selected for
ﬁeld checks.
On 15th of April, the State Election Commission (SEC) concluded that the cleanup was completed, but this decision
was not unanimous and it was boycotted by the President of the SEC as well as members representing SDSM. As
such the credibility of the voter registry is now in question. Meanwhile, a lack of media reform has added to concerns
over how level the playing ﬁeld will be for the parties in the run up to the elections. The lack of progress on this issue
led to several proposals for legislation by diﬀerent stakeholders, which were eventually rejected in the Parliament.
The Parliament dissolved on 15 April, further heightening the pressure for elections to take place in June.
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With all these accumulated setbacks, the only deterrent for electoral fraud was the possibility of the Special Public
Prosecutor charging individuals over previous violations. A subsequent investigation, which was dubbed the ‘Titanic’
case, was intended to do precisely this. The investigation involved high ranking oﬃcials from VMRO-DPMNE, who
were alleged to have organised systematic electoral abuses in previous elections.
However, the decision by the President of the Republic to pardon many politicians involved in these and other
investigations put an end to this prospect. His justiﬁcation for issuing the pardons centred on the notion that the
investigations could potentially be abused during the election period. He has so far failed to convince the relevant
experts, civil society actors, or the EU and the United States that his decision will be beneﬁcial. Reactions from the
EU’s Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, and the US
State department emphasised that the President’s decision risked seriously undermining the rule of law and the path
towards democratic recovery. The majority of legal experts are convinced that his decision is not based on a sound
legal footing and thus is unlawful. In addition, by halting investigations in their early stages, his decision has raised
concerns about unlawful intervention in the judiciary undermining the division of power between Macedonia’s three
branches of government.
Ultimately, this has simply exacerbated the political crisis. The only way toward reconciliation had been for those
involved in illegal activities to be charged and sentenced. This prompted citizens on 12 April to gather in front of the
Special Public Prosecutor oﬃce to show their support and march toward the President’s Citizens Contact Oﬃce in
the centre of Skopje as a protest. On the second day, the protests turned violent when the protesters demolished the
oﬃce and clashed with police. But the protests have since regained their peaceful character, with opposition
expressed through other means, such as painting public buildings or drawing graﬃti.
What is clear is that the elections can no longer feasibly be held in June and that the Przhino Agreement has failed
to deliver signiﬁcant results. The situation is also now a ‘make or break’ scenario for Macedonia’s civil society. Some
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civil society organisations have demanded the resignation of the President, while others have simply protested
against his decision to issue the pardons. They have also voiced support for an interim government to be
established with the aim of implementing the EU’s proposed reforms and then holding new elections. Even though
this could take a substantial period of time, the Przhino experience and the deﬁcient deadline based methodology it
has been based on oﬀer some evidence for why this could be a better option.
But for this to happen it will be necessary for civil society to demonstrate that another agreement will not be possible
without some responsibility being taken by those alleged to have engaged in corruption, abuse of oﬃce and
electoral fraud. Recent comments by the EU and the US about bringing back negotiations under the Przhino format
are distinctly unhelpful in this context. The international community’s attempts at moderation have allowed plenty of
room for manoeuvre for VMRO-DPMNE, who evidently have not demonstrated a sincere motivation for conducting
reforms.
A greater focus should instead be placed on supporting the protesters in demanding that negotiations are
reestablished, with those who are accused of wrongdoing prevented from taking up their seat at the table. It would
also be beneﬁcial for smaller political parties and civil society to have adequate representation in these negotiations.
And perhaps most importantly, the international community should show greater willingness to listen to local
organisations involved in monitoring the elections, who have consistently stated that the conditions for free elections
are simply not in place at present in Macedonia.
Meanwhile, the protests will continue regardless, with citizens demonstrating that the country’s institutions now have
little legitimacy in their eyes, having become co-opted for individual political gains. As Macedonia’s political
system continues to falter, it will be the country’s citizens who will be tasked with raising it from the ashes.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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